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PATHBREAKERS? WOMEN’S ELECTORAL SUCCESS AND
FUTURE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION*
Sonia Bhalotra, Irma Clots Figueras and Lakshmi Iyer
We investigate whether the event of women being competitively elected as state legislators
encourages subsequent political participation among women. Using a regression discontinuity design
on Indian constituency level data, we find that female incumbents are more likely than male
incumbents to re contest and that there is a decline in the entry of new women candidates. This
decline is most pronounced in states with entrenched gender bias and in male headed parties,
suggesting an intensification of barriers against women in these areas. Similar results for (mostly
male) Muslim candidates indicate the presence of institutionalised demand side barriers rather than
gender specific preferences and constraints.
Women are under-represented in political office around the world, accounting for only
23% of the membership of national parliaments globally. In 2015, they comprised 12%
of India’s national legislators, 19% of the US Congress and 29% of the UK’s House of
Commons. There is a similar under-representation of women in leadership positions in
other fields, including the corporate sector and academia (Bertrand and Hallock,
2001; Bertrand, 2009; Ginther and Kahn, 2014). For instance, in 2014, women
comprised 40% of the workforce globally but only 10% of corporate board members
globally and 4.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs. The numerical under-representation of
women in politics is often associated with substantive under-representation. Several
recent papers find that increasing women’s political representation results in policy
choices that are more favourable to women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Iyer
et al., 2012; Rehavi, 2012). Moreover, women’s political participation has been shown
to improve broader development outcomes such as investments in children (Miller,
2008; Clots-Figueras, 2012; Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras, 2014; Brollo and Troiano,
2016), economic performance (Baskaran et al., 2015) and corruption (Dollar et al.,
2001; Swamy et al., 2001). This literature suggests that women’s under-representation
in political office disadvantages one half of society, and may have additional social
costs.
Using data from India’s state legislative assembly elections, we investigate whether
the electoral success of women leads to subsequent increases in women’s participation
as political candidates. We focus upon women’s candidacy as the data suggest that the
small share of women candidates is an important proximate barrier to the presence of
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women in political office: women comprised 5.5% of election winners but only 4.4% of
electoral candidates.1 A woman’s demonstrated electoral success has the potential to
change the views of voters and parties regarding the role of women in politics, leading
to greater demand for women candidates. Alternatively, a woman winning could create
a positive ‘role model’ effect, encouraging other women to come forward as
candidates.2
We use nationwide data from 3,473 constituencies over the period 1980–2007 to
investigate whether a woman winning a seat in the state legislative assembly results in
greater participation of women from her constituency in subsequent elections.
Legislation on many important topics, including law and order, health and education,
is determined at the state level in India. Importantly, there are no political quotas for
women at this level, making our analysis different from recent studies of the impact of
gender quotas on subsequent political participation.
In order to estimate causal effects of women’s electoral victory, we use a regression
discontinuity (RD) design, comparing women’s political participation in places where
a woman narrowly won an election to those in which a woman narrowly lost an
election. We conduct several tests to verify the validity of the RD strategy. These include
showing that pre-determined political and demographic characteristics, as well as the
characteristics of the candidate pool, are similar across places where women won versus
lost in mixed-gender races. Our results are robust to controlling for election-specific
factors and using alternative samples, functional forms and bandwidths.
Our analysis yields four main insights. First, a woman’s electoral victory leads to an
increase in the share of women candidates from major parties in the next election.
This is primarily driven by an increased propensity of the incumbent woman to contest
for re-election. This intensive-margin response is important in India where, in contrast
to the US, incumbents often do not re-contest. Moreover, the baseline probability of
women incumbents re-contesting is smaller than for men: 34% of female incumbents
and 28% of male incumbents do not run for re-election despite the absence of any
term limits. Further analysis shows that the incumbency effect on women’s candidacy is
restricted to the party of the winning candidate: women incumbents are significantly
more likely than male incumbents to re-contest from the same party and significantly
less likely to switch parties. However, we find that incumbent women are not more
likely to win the next election.
Second, we can decisively reject that there is increased entry of new major party
women candidates in constituencies in which a woman won the previous election. In
fact, in most specifications, there is a significant decline in the entry of new women
candidates after a woman wins an election. This is not simply a consequence of the
incumbent woman’s greater probability of re-contesting. There is also no increase in
new women candidates in nearby constituencies or from the opposing party.
Third, we find striking evidence that this ‘discouragement’ effect on the entry of new
female candidates emerges from states characterised by entrenched gender bias,
proxied by population gender ratios (Sen, 2003). In these states, there is a significantly
1 No previous work has systematically analysed candidacy for competitive state assembly elections in India.
2 See Casas Arce and Saiz (2015) for a model in which the roles of voters, parties and candidates are
delineated.
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lower overall candidacy response after a woman wins an election, particularly within
male-headed parties, and the next election is marked by a significant decline in the
share of new women candidates. In sharp contrast, for states with relatively low levels of
entrenched prejudice, there is no decline in the new female candidate share (although
no increase either) and a larger probability that the incumbent woman re-contests. In
these areas, following women’s electoral success, we also see significant increases in
female and male voter turnout and the share of votes received by women. Our findings
are suggestive of a ‘backlash’ effect in the more gender unequal states, as they indicate
persistence and possible intensification of bias against women (from voters or political
parties) following women’s electoral victory.3 Such a backlash effect can decrease the
demand for new women candidates. An alternative possibility is a reduced supply of
new women candidates due to ‘stereotype threat’, which refers to minority groups
behaving in ways that confirm group stereotypes when their group identity is made
salient.4
Fourth, while it is inherently difficult to isolate demand versus supply factors, we are
able to rule out the role of specific supply side factors. We find that implementation of
a gender quota in local governments, which created a massive increase in the number
of women with political experience, increases the overall candidacy response in
gender-biased states but we continue to see a decline in the entry of new candidates.
This makes it unlikely that our findings are driven by a shortage of women who are
suitable political candidates. We also conduct a parallel analysis for Muslims, who form
India’s largest religious minority, are socio-economically disadvantaged and under-
represented in political office in India (Bhalotra et al., 2014). Our estimates for
Muslims are strikingly similar to our estimates for women: we find no increase in the
entry of new Muslim candidates following a Muslim winning office and a stronger
candidacy response in states in which Muslims are less disadvantaged. As Muslim
candidates are predominantly male, this makes it unlikely that the results for women
are on account of gender-specific constraints such as family commitments or a
reluctance to engage in competitive races.
Our study contributes to two main streams of the literature. The first concerns the
barriers facing women in attaining leadership positions. Most previous research
examining the impact of elected women leaders on future women’s political
participation has examined the impact of gender quotas.5 In contrast, our study
investigates the dynamics of women’s participation in state legislatures, where quotas
are absent. Demonstration effects of women leaders may be greater in the absence of
3 Previous studies have documented evidence of backlash whereby men react negatively to higher earnings
of women or to women performing non traditional roles (Schuler et al., 1996; Luke and Munshi, 2011; Mani,
2011; Bertrand et al., 2013; Gangadharan et al., 2016). Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) report a similar
heterogeneity in responses to women mayors in Italy. On average, they find a significantly greater probability
of early termination of the legislature when the mayor is a woman and this tendency is significantly stronger
in the Southern regions and when the mayor interacts with an entirely male council.
4 Stereotype threat, often measured by the performance of minority groups in standardised tests or
participation in meetings, has been documented for racial minorities (Steele and Aronson, 1995), lower
castes in India (Hoff and Pandey, 2006), women (Kray et al., 2002; Marx and Roman, 2002) and men in areas
of female expertise (Coffman, 2014) but it has not been analysed in the literature on women’s political
participation.
5 Beaman et al. (2009), Bhavnani (2009), Deininger and Nagarajan (2011) and Banerjee et al. (2013) all
examine the impact of local government gender quotas in specific regions of India.
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quotas, for several reasons. For instance, quotas may lead to political parties
strategically placing women candidates in races they are unlikely to win (Bagues and
Esteve-Volart, 2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015). Quotas can widen the quality gap
between male and female candidates and reinforce negative stereotypes if women in
reserved seats are less qualified than men (Coate and Loury, 1993; Bardhan et al., 2010;
Besley et al., forthcoming). Quotas can also generate negative spillovers in candidacy,
with fewer women being fielded in non-quota constituencies (see Sekhon and Titiunik
(2012), who reanalyse the quota results of Bhavnani (2009)). On the other hand,
quotas may have more positive effects on women’s candidacy than competitive victories
if women are more likely to enter competitive activities in a single-sex environment
(Gneezy et al., 2003).
We present the first estimates (for any country) of how within-constituency
political participation of women responds to the competitive electoral success of
women. The only other study we are aware of in a competitive setting is Broockman
(2013) who, similar to our study, finds no spillover effects of women winning seats
in US state legislatures on women’s candidacy in nearby constituencies. There is
little room to investigate within-constituency dynamics of women’s candidacy in the
US, since incumbents almost always run for re-election. The findings from the
analysis of quotas are mixed. Bertrand et al. (2014) analyse corporate board quotas
in Norway and find no impact on the career decisions of the next generation of
women, while de Paola et al. (2010) document increased political participation of
women in Italy after a short-term gender quota in local government. Beaman et al.
(2009) find no tangible improvements in subsequent candidacy or success among
women after a woman has led the village council for one term (five years) but
significant increases after a woman has headed the village council for two
consecutive terms.
Our results show that while electoral victory enables incumbent women to run for re-
election (a non-trivial margin in India), it does not result in increased entry of new
women candidates. Previous electoral victory for women also does not increase the
probability of a woman winning the next election. This means that repeated exposure
to female state legislators is unlikely to happen in a competitive setting, especially in
gender-biased states.
The second stream of research that we contribute to is that on incumbency
advantage.6 This literature has focused upon whether incumbents are more likely to
win the next election but winning is conditional on re-contesting. By testing whether
the incumbent re-contests, we effectively model this selection process, which is
important in many countries outside the US, such as India and Brazil, where a large
fraction of incumbents do not re-contest (De Magalhaes, 2014). Studies examining
gender differences in incumbency advantage include Ferreira and Gyourko (2014),
who show that female incumbents exhibit stronger winning chances in the US
6 There is a widely documented incumbency advantage in the US (Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz,
1996; Lee, 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2014) but previous work has documented an incumbency
disadvantage in India (Linden, 2004; Uppal, 2009) and other developing countries (Macdonald, 2014;
Klasnja and Titiunik, 2017). Most of these studies do not examine candidacy. See Erikson and Titiunik (2015)
for a recent discussion of the conditions under which the RD design can be used to recover the personal
incumbency advantage (in winning).
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(a setting where incumbents almost always re-contest) and Brollo and Troiano (2016),
who find weaker winning chances for women in Brazil, a setting with term limits.
Our study shows that candidacy dynamics after an electoral victory are strongly
dependent on the overall social context and that therefore there is no general gender
advantage or disadvantage. Another contribution of our work is that we deviate from
the recent tendency to analyse incumbency advantage at the party level. In the
presence of party-switching, which is a frequent occurrence in India and Brazil, for
example, it is relevant to study incumbent behaviour at the candidate level.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 1 provides background
information on the Indian political system, Section 2 describes our empirical strategy
and Section 3 performs many empirical checks on the validity of this strategy.
Sections 4 and 5 present our empirical findings; Section 6 concludes.
1. Women in Indian Politics
1.1. Indian Electoral Politics
India is the world’s largest democracy, with a parliamentary system of government at
both the federal and state levels. Elections are held every five years, on a first-past-the-
post system in single-member constituencies. States may occasionally hold midterm
elections, before the five-year term of the government expires, if the governing
coalition loses the confidence of the majority of the state legislature and an alternative
government cannot be formed. We focus on elections to state legislatures. In India’s
federal system, state governments are responsible for several development policy areas
including law and order, health and education, and the financing of village councils.
State level parties play a significant role in forming governing coalitions at the centre
and previous research has shown that state-level voting behaviour is highly correlated
with voting in national elections (Ravishankar, 2009).
There are currently no quotas for women in state or national level elections. A one-
third quota for women in district and village level councils was mandated by a
constitutional amendment in 1993.7 In March 2010, a bill proposing to enact a one-
third quota for women in national and state legislatures was passed by the upper house
of parliament but it has not yet been passed in the lower house, making the analysis in
this article highly topical.
In India’s political system, party leaders decide who their candidate will be in every
constituency.8 There are no primaries as in the United States and the process of
choosing candidates is not transparent. We conducted interviews with politicians from
several Indian political parties to understand the candidate selection process. In
general, it was described as follows: parties draw up an initial (informal) short list of
2–5 candidates from each constituency and then embark on information gathering
exercises, including third-party voter surveys, to assess candidate quality. The candidate
quality emphasised by all parties was the ability to attract votes, termed ‘winnability’ in
7 The impact of this reform has been examined in several recent papers, including Chattopadhyay and
Duflo (2004), Beaman et al. (2009) and Iyer et al. (2012).
8 See Norris and Lovenduski (1995) on the relative importance of party versus candidate decisions in the
UK.
.
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Indian politics. To this end, several metrics including candidate name recognition
within the constituency, service to the party, financial resources, caste identity and
internal party support were considered relevant. The candidate selection process was
described as being very constituency specific, with local name recognition and local
resources being important and it being unusual to ‘parachute’ in candidates from
outside the constituency.
1.2. Data on Women’s Political Participation in State Elections
We obtained data on elections to state legislative assemblies in 3,473 constituencies
from the Election Commission of India over the period 1980–2007, during which most
states had six elections. Electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed through this
period, so we do not have to worry about concerns such as gerrymandering which
might differentially affect the electoral prospects for women. We have information on
the name, gender, party affiliation and votes obtained by every candidate, as well as
gender-specific voter turnout by constituency. We use data for the 16 major states of
India that account for over 95% of the total population.9 We also obtained relevant
demographic data (literacy, urbanisation, gender ratio, fraction of lower castes and
tribes etc.) at the constituency level from the 2001 census, by matching villages to
constituencies.10
We tracked candidates by name over successive elections to identify whether
candidates in a specific election were present in the previous election.11 Overall, in our
sample, more than three-quarters of all candidates (85% of women and 83% of men)
did not contest the previous election, i.e. are ‘new’ candidates. Systematic data on
candidate attributes are available only after 2004, when the Election Commission made
it mandatory for all candidates to file affidavits giving details of their age, education,
asset ownership and any pending criminal charges. We have this information for
candidates in 14 out of 16 states that held elections between 2004 and 2007. Compared
to male candidates, women candidates are on average three years younger, less likely to
have completed high school and less likely to have any criminal charges filed against
them (summary statistics available upon request). In examining the validity of our
regression discontinuity strategy, we test whether these characteristics vary across
winners and losers in mixed-gender elections.
Despite the institution of universal adult suffrage since 1950, women are still
dramatically under-represented in India’s state legislatures. As mentioned earlier, only
5.5% of state legislators and 4.4% of candidates were women in our sample period,
1980–2007. Almost 70% of electoral races had no female candidates at all and only 7%
9 The states included are as follows: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh,
Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal. In 2001, three new states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand were carved out of the
larger states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, respectively. For the new states of Jharkhand and
Chhattisgarh, electoral constituency boundaries remained fixed over time. We drop the data from the
Uttarakhand state elections of 2002 and 2007 since we are unable to match the electoral constituencies over
time.
10 We thank Rikhil Bhavnani and Sandip Sukhtankar for sharing these data with us.
11 Candidate names are frequently spelt differently across elections and many candidates change party
affiliations. We therefore performed a manual matching of candidate names over time.
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of races had more than one woman candidate. Women’s candidacy shows a secular
increase over time but varies considerably across the states. For instance, in 2000–7, the
share of female candidates from major parties ranged from almost 13% in the state of
Andhra Pradesh to only 4% in the neighbouring state of Karnataka (Figure A1 in
online Appendix A).
State elections in India are very competitive. In our data, the mean number of
candidates per constituency is ten (median is eight). Of these, only three candidates on
average manage to obtain more than 5% of the votes cast, suggesting that the majority
of candidates in India’s electoral races are not politically viable. In order to focus on
candidates who are politically meaningful, we do two things. First, in many
specifications, we restrict attention to candidates from ‘major’ parties defined as those
parties that won at least 5% of the seats in any state legislature in any year over our
sample period. On average, only 34% of candidates in our data are from these major
parties. Second, we analyse separately the fraction of ‘competitive’ women candidates,
namely, those who win at least 5% of the vote in a given race. As we might expect, there
is a significant overlap between these two categories: 88% of major party candidates are
competitive according to this definition.
Major parties (as defined above) are more likely to nominate women candidates,
with 5.6% of their candidates being women compared to only 3.7% of independent
candidates. Over the period 1980–2007, only four out of 40 major parties in India were
headed by women.12 Women-headed parties have a slightly higher share of female
candidates, 7% compared to the 5% share for major parties not headed by women.
There is no a priori evidence that women avoid more competitive races. In fact,
electoral races in which a female candidate is present tend to have larger electorates
and a greater number of candidates.
2. Identifying the Effects of Women’s Electoral Success: The Regression
Discontinuity Design
We are interested in how indicators of women’s political participation at the electoral
constituency level respond to a woman having won the previous election. The
identification problem is that a woman’s political victory might be correlated with
unobserved constituency characteristics, such as voter preferences, that might directly
determine women’s participation in subsequent elections. We address these problems
using a regression discontinuity (RD) estimator, focusing on mixed-gender electoral
races. Treatment assignment depends on the running variable, the vote margin
between a woman and a man. The probability of a woman winning an election exhibits
a sharp discontinuity when this vote margin is zero, since the candidate with the most
votes wins, irrespective of how close the runner up stands.13 The identifying
assumption is that the assignment of treatment around the threshold (i.e. a woman
12 These are the Indian National Congress under Sonia Gandhi, the Bahujan Samaj Party under Mayawati,
the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam under Jayalalithaa and the All India Trinamul Congress
under Mamata Banerjee.
13 See Lee (2008) for the seminal use of the regression discontinuity design using electoral data. Studies
that use close elections between men and women include Rehavi (2012), Clots Figueras (2011, 2012),
Bhalotra and Clots Figueras (2014) and Brollo and Troiano (2016).
7
winner rather than a man) is uncorrelated with any observed or unobserved
characteristics of the candidate pool or the constituency.14 The estimated model is
of the form:
Yist ¼ a þ bWomanWonis;t 1 þ f ðMis;t 1Þ þ eist ; (1)
Yist is a measure of female political candidacy for constituency i in state s and year t. We
focus upon the share of women candidates (overall and among major parties) as well as
the probability of having at least one female candidate in the constituency and the
fraction of competitive female candidates. The running variableMis,t 1 is defined as the
vote share difference (in the previous election) between the female and male
candidates in the constituency who obtained the most votes, irrespective of whether
they were the winner and the runner up (similar to the strategy in Meyersson, 2014).
WomanWonis,t 1 is a dummy which equals one if a woman won against a man in the
previous election (Mis,t 1 > 0) and zero if the woman lost (Mis,t 1 < 0). The parameter
b captures the causal impact of this event on women’s participation as candidates in the
next election. In order to define Mis,t 1 consistently, the sample is restricted to
elections with at least one female candidate. The results are similar when we use a more
restricted sample of elections selected to ensure that the winner and runner-up are of
opposite gender (see Table A3 in online Appendix A). Standard errors are clustered at
the level of the administrative district to allow for correlated outcomes across all
constituencies within the same district and over time. This is more conservative than
clustering at the constituency level, though we verify that doing the latter leaves our
results unchanged.
We fit a flexible function of the vote margin, f(Mis,t 1), that is allowed to differ on
each side of the discontinuity, using three approaches to investigate sensitivity of
the estimates. First, we fit second-order polynomials (Lee et al., 2004) since Gelman
and Imbens (2014) argue against the use of higher order polynomials in RD
designs; we also show that our results are robust to using higher-order polynomials.
Second, we estimate local linear regressions (Hahn et al., 2001; Imbens and
Lemieux, 2008), restricting the sample to an optimal bandwidth around the
discontinuity, with the optimal bandwidth selected by applying the methods in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014). Finally, we also
investigate robustness to using a ‘discontinuity sample’, restricting the sample to a
very small bandwidth around the discontinuity and testing the differences in means
on both sides of the discontinuity (Angrist and Lavy, 1999).
To investigate area spillovers, we replace the dependent variable in (1) with an
indicator of women’s political participation in constituencies other than the index
constituency i, but within the same administrative district (which typically consists of
9–10 electoral constituencies), or parliamentary constituency (typically covering 6–8
state electoral constituencies). To examine persistence in the relationship of interest,
we re-estimate (1), replacing the first lag with longer lags. This provides reduced form
estimates of how women’s participation in election t responds to a woman having won
14 We thus implicitly test whether winning matters discontinuously, that is, significantly more than a good
electoral performance that falls short of winning (captured by women being runners up in the ‘control
group’ of constituencies in which women lose mixed gender elections).
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in election t  2 or t  3 (ten and 15 years ago), respectively. We do not condition
upon whether a woman won in each intervening period because this is endogenous.
While regression discontinuity estimates are likely to satisfy internal validity
conditions, they may or may not have external validity. However, there are several
indications that our results have considerable external validity. First, Figure 1(a) shows
that the vote share obtained by all women contesting in constituencies in which the
margin of victory between the male and female candidates is close to zero ranges from
less than 20% to 65%. In favour of external validity, this shows a wide variation in
preferences for female politicians in our sample. Second, we examined the extent to
which the identity of constituencies that have mixed-gender elections changes from
one election year to the next and found that there is a fair degree of churning; among
the constituencies that have at least one mixed-gender election, nearly 60% have had
only one or two mixed-gender elections over this three-decade period. This again
points to external validity inasmuch as it establishes that a wide variety of constituencies
have experienced mixed-gender elections. In addition, OLS results using the whole
sample are fairly similar to the RD results.15 Since constituencies that have at least one
woman candidate vary over time, restricting to these samples creates an unbalanced
panel (Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). We therefore estimated the coefficient of interest
for one pair of election years at a time to investigate the stability of the relationship
across areas and years, and found no significant differences in the estimates (available
on request).
3. Investigating the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
Before presenting our results, we conduct several checks to ensure the validity of our
empirical strategy, namely, that the only variable that varies discontinuously at the vote
margin of zero is the gender of the elected candidate, rather than other area or
candidate characteristics, or the vote margin itself.
3.1. Preferences for Women Politicians and Continuity of the Vote Margin
An assumption underlying the RD strategy is that preferences for female politicians are
similar on both sides of the discontinuity, so that the discontinuity isolates the role of
the gender of the winner. We measure preferences for female politicians as the
fraction of votes won by all women contesting in the constituency. Figure 1(b) shows
that the assumption holds, there being no jump in the female vote share at the zero
vote margin. We should emphasise that we are comparing areas where women won
with those in which a woman lost, i.e. both types of areas had women candidates. While
greater electoral competition has been shown to increase women’s political partici-
pation within parties (Folke and Rickne, 2016), our comparison is within the set of
15 We run OLS regressions for the full sample, controlling for constituency and election cycle fixed
effects, and district specific linear time trends. The OLS sample differs primarily in that it includes
elections in which there are no female candidates, thereby extending the ‘control group’ of constituencies
to include a wider and more heterogeneous set of areas. These results are available in Table A2 in online
Appendix A.
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highly competitive places since the identification comes from comparing elections with
narrow electoral victories for women to elections with narrow electoral losses for
women.
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Fig. 1. Preferences for Women Politicians. (a) Vote Share of Women Politicians Across Different Victory
Margins. (b) No Discontinuity in Preferences for Women Politicians
Notes. Constituency year observations for the sample of elections with at least one woman
candidate. Female vote share is the vote share of all female candidates in the constituency; victory
margin is the difference in vote share between the top two vote winners of opposite genders.The
fitted values are a lowess line. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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Another RD assumption is that the density of the running variable, the vote margin
between the female and the male candidate, is continuous at the winning threshold,
i.e. at the zero vote margin. We plotted the density of the vote margin which looks
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Fig. 2. Continuity of the Victory Margin Between Female and Male Candidates. (a) Density of the Victory
Margin. (b) Testing for Density Discontinuities at Zero (McCrary Test)
Notes. Sample restricted to constituencies where there was at least one woman candidate.
Discontinuity estimate in Figure (b) (log difference in height): 0.0065 (SE 0.1053). Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
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smooth throughout (Figure 2(a)) and, following McCrary (2008), we formally verify
that there is no significant discontinuity at the zero point (Figure 2(b)). Manipulation
of the vote margin is unlikely in our setting, since the Election Commission of India
has a well-established reputation for independence and political and Indian elections
are considered free and fair.
3.2. Continuity in Candidate Characteristics
We verify that the characteristics of the candidate pool are very similar across places
where women win elections and places where women do not. Figure 3 examines a
range of candidate characteristics including education levels, net worth, whether the
candidate is an incumbent and whether the candidate belongs to a women-headed
party and whether any criminal charges have been filed against the candidate
(including corruption charges).16 We find that the candidate pool looks very similar in
all these dimensions across places where women won elections and where they did not.
In separate analyses, we have also verified that the characteristics of male candidates
and female candidates look very similar across places where women won and where
women lost (results available upon request).
Recent studies have questioned the validity of the RD premise that the (party) identity
of the winner is quasi-random in close elections, showing that the incumbent party in US
elections tends to have systematically greater chances of winning even when elections are
close, consistent with incumbents using their greater power to manipulate their chances
(Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Grimmer et al., 2011). However, Eggers et al. (2015) argue
that such sorting is unique to the US House in the post-war period and find no evidence
of it in several other countries including India. Along these lines, we have verified that
candidate characteristics such as age, gender, education, net worth or incumbency do
not predict success in mixed-gender races (results available upon request).
3.3. Continuity in Demographic and Political Characteristics
We also verified that a range of demographic covariates (population gender ratios,
literacy rates, proportion of lower castes and backward tribes, the male-female literacy
differential) and pre-determined electoral variables (total number of votes polled, the
number of major party female candidates and female voter turnout in the previous
election) do not vary discontinuously at the RD threshold (Figures 4(a)–(g)). This
gives us confidence that our results do not reflect pre-existing demographic or political
differences across places where women won or did not win elections.
16 Female politicians may be more likely to have family connections to other politicians than male
politicians in India’s national parliament (French, 2011) and in the US (Dal Bo et al., 2009). Due to the large
number of candidates for state legislative assembly elections across the country we are unable to replicate the
French (2011) methodology of contacting local journalists in each constituency to assess the extent of such
connections at the local level. As French says, ‘It was not enough to take prominent names and make larger
deductions from them. Equally, much of the information did not seem to exist. Only someone who worked at
a local level, perhaps as a political journalist, would be likely to know how each MP in their area entered
politics’. However, it is unlikely that family connections of the winner matter in mixed gender close
elections, given that we show all other observable characteristics of female winners and female runners up to
be similar.
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4. Main Results: Does Women’s Political Participation Respond to Prior
Electoral Success?
We first investigate whether women’s electoral success leads to an increase in the
share of female candidates in the next election and test robustness to varying the RD
specification. We find an increase in the overall share of major party women
candidates following a woman’s electoral victory, primarily driven by women
incumbents being more likely to re-contest than male incumbents. We find no
increase in the entry of new women candidates and, in many specifications, a
significant decline. In Section 5, we investigate the potential mechanisms behind
these findings.
4.1. Political Candidacy
The event of a woman winning an election leads to a large and statistically
significant increase of 18.5 percentage points in the probability of a major party
fielding at least one woman candidate in the subsequent election in her
constituency (Table 1, panel (a), column (1)). This translates into an 8.5
percentage point increase in the female share of major party candidates (column
(2)), which corresponds to 40% of a standard deviation in the sample of
constituencies with at least one female candidate. A visual representation of these
estimates is in Figure 5(a), which shows a jump in the probability of having a major
party female candidate at the zero vote margin, to the left of which a woman
narrowly lost the previous election and to the right of which a woman narrowly won
the previous election against a man. We see a similar discontinuity for the female
share of major party candidates (Figure 5(b)). As the share of female candidates will
rise if there are more women or if there are fewer candidates in all, we investigated
candidate numbers. We find an increase in the number of major party female
candidates (column (3)); and no significant change in the total number of
candidates from major parties (column (4)), which indicates that women candidates
effectively substitute for male candidates.
We also model the competitiveness of women by defining as the dependent
variable, the share of women among candidates who get at least 5% of total votes cast.
This is significantly higher in constituencies in which a woman won in the previous
election (column (5)). This establishes that the increase in candidacy that we observe
following an electoral victory by a female politician is of politically viable women
fielded by politically relevant parties. In contrast to the observed increase in women’s
candidacy within major parties, the fraction of independent women candidates –
those not affiliated with any party – does not increase (column (6)).17 We find no
significant impact of women having won the previous election on the chances of a
woman winning the current election (column (7)). This is consistent with previous
evidence indicating an incumbency disadvantage in Indian state elections (Uppal,
2009).
17 Given that major parties account for only one third of candidates overall, we find no increase in overall
female candidacy after a woman’s electoral victory. 
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4.2. Robustness of RD Estimates
We investigate robustness of the estimates to varying the functional form of the
running variable in regressions run on the full sample, to estimating local linear
regressions with varying bandwidths (including a very narrow discontinuity sample), to
0
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0.6
0.8
−50 0 50
Victory Margin Between Female and Male Candidate
Any Female Candidate (Major Party) Fitted Values (Male Wins)
Fitted Values (Female Wins)
Victory Margin Aggregated into 2% Bins
0
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Victory Margin Between Female and Male Candidate
Female Share of Major Party Candidates Fitted Values (Male Wins)
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Victory Margin Aggregated into 2% Bins
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Women’s Political Candidacy. (a) At Least One Woman
Candidate from a Major Party. (b) Female Share of Major Party Candidates
Note. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com
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controlling for election-specific factors, and to restricting the sample to elections in
which the top two vote-getters are a man and a woman. We also present a placebo
check in which we vary the discontinuity point.
4.2.1. Robustness to functional form and sample for the running variable
The specification in Table 1 (panel (a)) controls for a quadratic polynomial in the
victory margin, which is allowed to be different on either side of the discontinuity. We
verify that the coefficients on the suite of outcomes in Table 1 remain similar in size and
significance when a local linear regression is estimated on a sample restricted to an
optimal bandwidth around the discontinuity, using optimal bandwidths as specified by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) in panel (b) and by Calonico et al. (2014) in panel (c).
We conduct further checks for the female share of major party candidates, which is
themain outcome in Table 1. First we generalise the polynomial in the victory margin to
the third and fourth order, retaining the full sample, and we find very little change in the
coefficient of interest (Table A3 in online Appendix A, columns (1) and (2)) We then
restrict the sample to small bandwidths of 0.1 and then 0.05, controlling for linear trends
on either side of the discontinuity in the first case and simply comparing themean of the
dependent variable on both sides of the discontinuity for the smaller bandwidth, along
the lines ofAngrist andLavy (1999), andour results remainunchanged (columns (3) and
(4)). The estimates in column (5) examine the stability of the estimated coefficient to
inclusion of a vector of state-year fixed effects which control for all relevant election-
specific factors such as whether the previous chief minister was a woman, whether there
was a woman party leader in the current election, or whether a new woman-headed party
had been formed. The estimated coefficient retains its size and significance. Our results
are also unchanged if we cluster the standard errors at the finer constituency level rather
than the district level (column (6)).
Finally, we restrict the sample to elections where a woman and a man were among
the top two candidates in terms of votes won. This may be relevant if, for instance, the
top two candidates are men but a woman is close behind as the third vote-winner. The
coefficients are similar to the baseline results in size and significance, both when we
control for a second-order polynomial on either side of the discontinuity (column (7))
and when we use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (column (8)). Our
results remain similar when we further restrict the sample to elections in which the
third candidate did not have a chance to win i.e. elections where the margin between
the first and third candidates was larger than 5%, 10% or 20% (results available upon
request).
4.2.2. Fake or placebo discontinuities
We tested for discontinuous increases in candidacy at points of the vote margin
distribution at which there should be no jumps, that is, at points other than zero, as
suggested in Imbens andLemieux (2008).We re-computed theRDestimates using ‘fake’
discontinuities at various points both to the left and to the right of the actual
discontinuity. Figure A2 in online Appendix A plots the t-statistics obtained from this
series of RD estimates. We see that the largest t-statistic is at the real discontinuity, i.e. at
the zero point, while all other t-statistics at placebodiscontinuity points indicate statistical
insignificance.
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4.3. New Candidate Entry Versus Incumbent Candidacy
In this subsection, we examine how much of the observed rise in women’s candidacy is
attributable to the entry of new women candidates. We identify incumbent as opposed
to new candidates by tracking candidates through our sample by their name. We find
no evidence of new candidate entry, in fact, the regression coefficient for the new
female share of major party candidates is negative and statistically significant for two of
the three RD estimators (Table 2, column (1), panels (a) and (b)); we investigate this
in more detail below. There is no significant impact of women’s victory on the entry of
new male candidates (column (2)).
Incumbent women are significantly more likely to run for re-election than incumbent
men (column (3)). While this is consistent with the idea that women candidates are
positively selected (as shown in the US by Anzia and Berry, 2011), we should note that in
India, there is a gender gap that disfavours women in the baseline probability of women
incumbents running for re-election: 34% of female winners and 28% of male winners
Table 2
Impact of Women’s Electoral Success on New Versus Incumbent Candidates
New female
share of major
party candidates
New male
share of major
party candidates
Incumbent
runs for
re election
Incumbent runs
for re election from
the same party
Incumbent runs
for re election from
a different party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel (a): controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won
previous
election
0.023** 0.025 0.065* 0.149*** 0.084***
(0.010) (0.024) (0.038) (0.038) (0.024)
Observations 5,874 5,874 5,881 5,881 5,881
Mean of
dependent
variable
0.04735 0.5338 0.6226 0.5092 0.1134
Panel (b): local linear regressions with Imbens Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous
election
0.024** 0.021 0.071 0.159*** 0.091***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.043) (0.044) (0.022)
Optimal
bw (IK)
0.2731 0.2566 0.2319 0.2352 0.3489
Observations 2,105 1,976 1,795 1,818 2,889
Panel (c): local linear regressions with Calonico Cattaneo Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous
election
0.01 0.008 0.036 0.162*** 0.094***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.054) (0.053) (0.030)
Optimal
bw (CCT)
0.1247 0.1647 0.1475 0.1511 0.2112
Observations 1,059 1,344 1,229 1,254 1,648
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. New candidates are defined as candidates who did not run in the previous
election. They were identified by manual matching of candidate names across election years. Sample includes
all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014). Optimal bandwidths are determined by the
algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT).
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do not run for re-election in the full sample. Since party-switching is frequent in India,
we investigated incumbent candidacy by party. We find that women incumbents are
more likely than male incumbents to contest from the incumbent party (Table 2,
column (4)) and significantly less likely to switch parties in the election after they win
(column (5)). These results retain their size and significance regardless of the
specification or the bandwidth used (Table 2, panels (b) and (c)).
It is possible that the presence of an incumbent woman politician might discourage
new female candidates in her constituency due to splitting of the gendered votes.
While we cannot test this rigorously because the incumbent’s decision to contest is
endogenous, we have verified that the impact on new female candidate entry does not
differ by whether the incumbent chooses to run for re-election (new female candidate
share declines by 1.8 percentage points when the incumbent is running for re-election,
and by 2.3 percentage points when the incumbent does not run for re-election).
Table 3
Candidacy Effects Across Parties and Across Geographies
Incumbent party
has a female
candidate
(dummy)
Non incumbent
parties have a female
candidate (dummy)
Female share of major
party candidates in
nearby constituencies
(other constituencies
in same district)
Female share of major
party candidates in
nearby constituencies
(other constituencies
in same parliamentary
constituency)
All major
parties
Incumbent
party
All major
parties
Incumbent
party
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel (a): controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won
previous
election
0.535*** 0.142*** 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.007
(0.031) (0.043) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Observations 5,881 5,881 5,867 5,874 5,874 5,881
Panel (b): local linear regressions with Imbens Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous
election
0.541*** 0.161*** 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.011
(0.031) (0.051) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Optimal
bw (IK)
0.2725 0.2063 0.2666 0.2737 0.2807 0.229
Observations 2,104 1,617 2,064 2,113 2,166 1,773
Panel (c): local linear regressions with Calonico Cattaneo Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous
election
0.536 *** 0.178 *** 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.020
(0.044) (0.053) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
Optimal
bw (CCT)
0.133 0.1885 0.1195 0.1371 0.1217 0.1199
Observations 1,116 1,493 1,018 1,146 1,041 1,025
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK)
and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT).
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4.4. Candidacy Spillovers Across Parties and Constituencies
In this subsection, we first examine party-level (rather than candidate-level) responses
and then examine whether there are any spillovers of a woman winning in a given
constituency on women’s participation in nearby constituencies. We find that, in
constituencies where women won the previous election, it is strictly only the winner’s
party that is more likely to field a woman candidate in the next election and, as we
saw above, this candidate tends to be the winner herself. Parties that lost the previous
election to a woman are significantly less likely to nominate a woman (Table 3,
columns (1) and (2)). The losing party typically fielded a man so this result simply
means that in the next election, despite the man losing to a woman, they continued
to field a man.
While the presence of an incumbent woman politician might discourage new female
candidates in her constituency (as it would split the gendered votes), it might
nevertheless encourage greater participation in nearby areas. However, we find no
evidence of increased female candidacy, whether from the incumbent party or other
parties, in constituencies within the same district (Table 3, columns (3) and (4)) or
within the same national parliamentary constituencies (columns (5) and (6)). In
separate regressions (not shown), we replaced the female share of candidates with the
new female share and found similar results, i.e. that there is no tendency towards
increased entry of new women in nearby constituencies. Using data from the US,
Broockman (2013) similarly finds no impact of a woman being elected on the
participation of women in nearby areas.
In the next Section, we push the analysis further by investigating voter, party and
candidate responses to women winning with a view to understanding better the
mechanisms behind our findings.
5. Mechanisms and Further Analysis
In this Section we investigate whether the weak demonstration effects we find are
driven primarily by ‘demand-side’ factors, such as voter and party attitudes towards
women candidates, or by limitations on the supply of potential candidates, such as a
shortage of suitable female candidates, or the existence of gender-specific constraints
that make women less likely than men to contest as candidates. We use male and
female electoral turnout, votes cast for women versus men and women’s winning
chances as indicators of voter preferences,18 and the gender of the party leader as an
indicator of party preferences over women.
5.1. Heterogeneity by Indicators of Gender Prejudice
Since the views of voters and parties are likely to be shaped by prevailing social norms
regarding the role of women, we investigate whether the candidacy response to
electoral victory varies by indicators of societal gender bias. India has a long history of
18 Voter turnout is often used as an indicator of political participation and interest in politics. For instance,
Washington (2006) shows that black and white turnout rates increase in response to black candidates on the
ballot in US elections.
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gender prejudice that has resulted in millions of women ‘missing’ on account of
sex-selective abortion, female infanticide and discrimination against girls and
women in terms of nutrition and health care. There were 940 women per 1,000
men in India in the 2011 census which translates to about 0.86 million ‘missing
women’. The population sex ratio is now widely used to proxy for women’s social
disadvantage (Sen, 2003; Bhalotra and Cochrane, 2010; Jayachandran and
Kuziemko, 2011).
The population gender ratio varies widely across states, from 861 women per 1,000
men in the northern state of Haryana to 1058 in the southern state of Kerala. A
remarkable division seems to run right across India, splitting the country into two
nearly contiguous halves, with missing women in the north and west but not in the
south and east of the country (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Sen, 2003); some studies have
attributed this to time-invariant factors such as soil quality (Carranza, 2014). In view of
this marked heterogeneity across states, we re-estimate the response of women’s
candidacy to women winning for the groups of states with sex ratios above and below
the median.19
We find a much bigger response of women’s candidacy to women’s electoral victory
in states in which the population sex ratio is less skewed or more favourable to women
(Table 4, columns (1) and (2)). In particular, the female share of major party
candidates increases by 5.2 percentage points in states where the gender ratio is skewed
against women, while the corresponding effect is 13.9 percentage points in states
where the gender ratio is less biased, and this difference in the RD coefficients is
statistically significant.20 This remarkable difference is driven both by a difference in
the share of new women candidates, where a negative effect is observed only in the
more gender-biased states (columns (3) and (4) and Figure A3 in online Appendix A),
and in the share of non-new female candidates (columns (5) and (6)). This suggests
that a social context that disadvantages women leads to a weaker candidacy response by
both new and non-new candidates after a woman demonstrates the ability to win an
election.
While the results in Table 4 are estimated using state-level gender ratios from the
2001 census as a proxy for gender bias, the results are robust to using other measures.
We first show that these patterns hold up to using a different proxy for women’s status,
namely, the male-female literacy differential. Women’s educational outcomes are
much poorer than those of men: only 65% of women in India were recorded as literate
in the census of 2011, compared to 82% of men. We find that the female candidacy
response to women winning is weaker in states where the male-female literacy
differential is below the median and that a significant ‘discouragement’ effect on new
women candidates is present only for these states (Table A4 in online Appendix A,
columns (1) and (2)). Both of these patterns, namely, a lower overall candidacy
response and a significant negative effect on the entry of new women candidates, are
19 Fisman et al. (2014) similarly divide India into two halves marked by long standing differences in
corruption for the purpose of testing a mechanism (rent seeking behaviour).
20 The difference in the coefficients was tested using a difference in discontinuities specification following
Grembi et al. (2016). The assumptions of this model are milder than those required for a cross sectional RD
design or for a difference in differences strategy.
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present when we use either the gender ratios from the 1981 census (columns (3) and
(4)) or gender ratios at the constituency rather than the state level (columns (5) and
(6)). Note that the constituency-level gender ratios are subject to the influence of
migration across constituency boundaries, while cross-state migration in India is
extremely low (Mistri, 2015).21
A potential explanation of the results is backlash, namely that seeing women in
leadership positions intensifies societal bias against women and that this is
exhibited in voter and party leader behaviour. We investigate this in the next
subsection.
Table 4
Women’s Electoral Success and Political Candidacy: Heterogeneity by State Level Gender Prejudice
Female
share of major
party candidates
New female
share of major
party candidates
Non new
(incumbent + losers)
female share of major
party candidates
Female population
share
Female population
share Female population share
Low High Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel (a): controlling for quadratic polynomials in the running variable
Woman won
previous election
0.052** 0.139*** 0.032** 0.002 0.085*** 0.141***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029)
Observations 3,714 2,160 3,714 2,160 3,714 2,160
Panel (b): local linear regressions with Imbens Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous election
0.041 0.176*** 0.031** 0.005 0.069*** 0.160***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031)
Observations 929 1,039 1,195 867 887 825
Optimal bw (IK) 0.1982 0.3643 0.254 0.3043 0.1885 0.2877
Panel (c): local linear regressions with Calonico Cattaneo Titiunik optimal bandwidth
Woman won
previous election
0.030 0.121** 0.035* 0.022 0.054* 0.053
(0.031) (0.049) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) (0.049)
Observations 781 347 648 480 648 342
Optimal bw (CCT) 0.1625 0.0992 0.129 0.141 0.1291 0.0973
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Optimal bandwidths are determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK)
and Calonico et al. (2014) (CCT). Low and high female population share refer to states with female
population share above or below the national average.
21 Recent work has documented that the fraction of female candidates is higher in constituencies reserved
for the scheduled castes (SC) in India (Jensenius, 2016). Since the caste composition does not vary
discontinuously at our threshold, this does not constitute a threat to our identification strategy. However, we
do find that the discouragement effect for new female candidates is larger for SC reserved constituencies,
consistent with our findings since these constituencies have worse gender ratios and higher literacy
differentials compared to unreserved constituencies.
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5.2. Voter and Party Behaviour
Since candidates are chosen by political parties with a view to winning elections, party
choices will reflect any gender bias among voters, as well as any bias among party
leaders over and above voter bias. We examine whether voters and parties behave
differently after observing a woman winning, distinguishing the behaviour of male and
female voters and male and female party leaders.
Voter behaviour is indicated by electoral turnout and by votes cast for female as
opposed to male candidates. We find that both female and male voter turnout are
significantly greater in constituencies that were won by women in the preceding
election but only in states with more equal gender ratios, there being no significant
response in the more gender-prejudiced states (Table 5, panel (a), columns (1)–(4)).
A woman’s electoral victory increases the vote share of all women candidates and the
chances of a woman winning the next election, more in states with better gender ratios
compared to states with worse gender ratios, indicating a preference for women leaders
in the better states. However, these differences in the coefficients are not statistically
significant (Table 5, panel (b), columns (1–4)).
If voters or party leaders are more likely to update their views after repeated
exposure to women leaders, we might observe larger effects on political candidacy over
Table 5
Women’s Electoral Success and Voter Behaviour
Female population share Female population share
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a): voter turnout in subsequent election
Female voter turnout Male voter turnout
Woman won previous election 0.009 0.055*** 0.003 0.052***
(0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014)
Observations 3,713 2,158 3,713 2,158
Panel (b): preferences for women candidates
Whether a woman wins the
next election
Vote share of all women
candidates
Woman won previous election 0.033 0.046 0.028 0.073**
(0.044) (0.054) (0.021) (0.032)
Observations 3,714 2,167 3,714 2,167
Panel (c): female share of major party candidates in later elections
Second lag Third lag
Woman won previous election 0.020 0.072* 0.002 0.019
(0.025) (0.039) (0.024) (0.051)
Observations 2,939 1,649 2,171 1,120
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Regressions control for quadratic polynomials in the running variable. See Table A3 in online Appendix A
for robustness to alternative bandwidth selection methods.
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time. However, there are very few constituencies in India in which women win a state
assembly seat in a competitive election for two consecutive terms (less than 5% of our
RD sample), making it hard to test for this repeated exposure effect in our data.
Moreover, winning the second time is endogenous in the competitive setting, so we
investigate the reduced form i.e. the response of candidacy in election t to a woman
having won two elections ago (t  2) and three elections ago (t  3). At the ten-year
mark (two elections later), we see a marginally significant increase in the share of
women candidates from major parties in the states with better gender ratios and no
effect at all on overall female candidacy in states with worse gender ratios (Table 5,
panel (c), columns (1) and (2)). At the fifteen-year mark, the candidacy response
drops to effectively zero in all states (Table 5, panel (c), columns (3) and (4)).
We now examine the role of parties. If the different results we noted in more and less
prejudiced contexts are attributable to intensification of gender bias within parties
and, if male-headed parties are more likely to show such intensification, then we expect
a lower candidacy response in male-headed parties in gender-biased areas. This is
indeed what we find: candidacy responses to women’s electoral victory are similar
across all states among parties headed by women (Table 6, panel (a), columns (1) and
(2)). Among parties headed by men, however, we see a significantly higher candidacy
response in states with better gender ratios (Table 6, panel (a), columns (3) and (4)).
The patterns for new female candidates are similar across male and female headed
parties (Table 6, panel (b)), suggesting that gender bias persistence within parties
tends to make the path to candidacy more difficult for women who participated in the
previous election.
Table 6
Women’s Electoral Success and Future Candidacy: Heterogeneity by Party Gender
Female population share Female population share
Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a): female share of major party candidates
Major parties headed by
women
Major parties headed by men
Woman won previous election 0.002 0.008 0.050** 0.132***
(0.012) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
Observations 3,714 2,160 3,714 2,160
Panel (b): new female share of major party candidates
Major parties headed by
women
Major parties headed by men
Woman won previous election 0.015** 0.012 0.018* 0.010
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019)
Observations 3,714 2,160 3,714 2,160
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Regressions control for quadratic polynomials in the running variable.
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Overall, the results are consistent with women’s electoral victory leading to a
persistence and possible intensification of gender bias in more gender-prejudiced
states, particularly within male-headed parties. This is of course the opposite of the
prediction of a model of statistical discrimination.22 Our finding that, in less
prejudiced states, incumbent women are more likely than incumbent men to re-
contest is consistent with statistical discrimination being lowered for women who have
been selected in (as in Fryer, 2007). However, in more prejudiced states, we see what
would appear to be a rise in taste-based discrimination.
In the next subsection, we examine two alternative explanations related to
potential constraints on the supply of new candidates. First, we examine the extent to
which a shortage of suitably experienced potential women candidates is a binding
constraint. Second, to investigate the extent to which barriers to the entry of new
women are gender-specific, we perform a parallel analysis of candidates belonging to
a religious minority group (Muslims), who are also under-represented in political
office.
5.3. Supply of Experienced Candidates
The failure of new women candidates to contest in women-led constituencies may
reflect a shortage of suitably qualified women candidates. In general, it is difficult to
find experimental or exogenous variation but we are able to exploit a massive shock to
Table 7
Women’s Electoral Success and Political Candidacy Before and After Local Government Quotas
Local government quotas Local government quotas
No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel (a): female share of major party candidates
Female population share is low Female population share is high
Woman won previous election 0.019 0.094*** 0.224*** 0.085**
(0.030) (0.035) (0.054) (0.041)
Observations 2,220 1,494 855 1,305
Panel (b): new female share of major party candidates
Female population share is low Female population share is high
Woman won previous election 0.029** 0.038* 0.014 0.001
(0.015) (0.021) (0.032) (0.025)
Observations 2,220 1,494 855 1,305
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any female candidates as in Meyersson (2014).
Regressions control for quadratic polynomials in the running variable.
22 Statistical discrimination involves stereotypes generated by the average performance of a group being
applied to individual members of the group, and the reason that groups who are in an effective minority are
often discriminated against is that the signal they emit is noisier (Phelps, 1972).
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the availability of women with some political experience created by the institution of
quotas for women in local government. A constitutional amendment of 1993 set aside
one-third of all seats in village, municipality and district councils for women, a large
increase from the pre-reform share of approximately 5%. This created a cadre of
women with the experience, networks and potentially, the motivation to remain in
the political sphere and contest for legislative assembly seats. As in Iyer et al. (2012),
we use plausibly exogenous state-specific variation in the implementation of the
mandate and obtain separate RD estimates for women’s candidacy response to
women winning for periods before and after the implementation of the local
government quota.
We find a significantly higher candidacy response after quotas are implemented but
only in states with more biased gender ratios (Table 7, panel (a), columns (1–4)).
However, in neither group of states is the share of new candidates significantly different
after the introduction of quotas (Table 7, panel (b)). Overall, there is no evidence that
shortages of suitably experienced women candidates drive our result of no new entry
after a woman wins.
5.4. Gender specific Constraints
Even if there is a cadre of women politicians in local government councils, they may be
reluctant to compete for the post of state legislator, a post that is far more demanding.
Recent work has highlighted gender-specific barriers to women’s participation in
executive positions, which are competitive and typically involve intensive and inflexible
work schedules (Bertrand et al., 2010). Laboratory evidence suggests that women tend
to be less over-confident and more averse to competition than men (Petrie and Segal,
2014; Niederle, 2016) and a number of studies underline the role of fertility and family
commitments in limiting women’s careers (Goldin, 2014). As discussed earlier, a
related possibility is an increased reluctance of potential women candidates to enter
politics due to ‘stereotype threat’.
We investigate this by conducting a parallel analysis for Muslims, with a view to
isolating the role of women-specific constraints from the role of continued or
intensified prejudice against a group with initially small representation. Muslims are
the largest religious minority in India, constituting 14.2% of the population in 2011
(Hindus constitute the majority). We created a new data set containing the religious
identity of all political candidates in India’s state elections, identifying Muslim
candidates by their name. Our data show that Muslims are under-represented in almost
all major states: over the period 1980–2010, Muslims constituted 9.2% of all election
candidates and 7.6% of election winners, and almost all (98%) of Muslim candidates
are men. Similar to the literature on the impact of women representatives, there is
some evidence that increasing the political representation of Muslims alters policy
choices, leading to improved health and education outcomes (Bhalotra et al., 2014).
Here, we estimate how the share of Muslim candidates in a constituency changes in
response to a Muslim having won the previous election in a competitive race against a
non-Muslim. Just as women are less educated than men in India on average, Muslims
are less educated than non-Muslims on average. In contrast to the case for women
versus men, there is a significant difference in the party affiliations of Muslim versus
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non-Muslim candidates,23 so we control for party identity in order to isolate the effect
of the religion of the politician.
The results for Muslims are very similar to the results for women. In the election
after a Muslim wins a state seat, there is an increase in the share of candidates who are
Muslim in that constituency, and this is statistically significant at the 10% level
(Table 8, panel (a), columns (1)–(4)). Importantly, there is no increase in the fraction
of new Muslim candidates and the coefficient estimate is negative though not
statistically significant (Table 8, panel (b)). So, just as we found for women candidates,
the overall effects on Muslim candidacy are driven by incumbent Muslim candidates
being more likely to re-contest and there is no entry of new candidates.
Also similar to our results for women, the coefficient of interest varies systematically
across the states with indicators of Muslim disadvantage. The positive effects on
candidacy are larger in states where Muslims constitute a higher share of the
Table 8
Muslims’ Electoral Success and Future Political Candidacy: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Muslim population
share
Hindu Muslim
literacy differential
Low High High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel (a): Muslim share of major party candidates
Muslim won
previous
election
0.028 0.037* 0.094*** 0.050 0.015 0.045** 0.033 0.067*
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.053) (0.021) (0.023) (0.037)
Observations 7,636 7,636 2,447 1,392 1,787 5,849 4,820 2,816
Panel (b): new Muslim candidate share in major parties
Muslim won
previous
election
0.028 0.023 0.009 0.005 0.085** 0.01 0.016 0.04
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.026) (0.041) (0.020) (0.022) (0.032)
Observations 7,636 7,636 3,430 1,444 1,787 5,849 4,820 2,816
Polynomial 2nd
order
2nd
order
2nd
order
2nd
order
2nd
order
2nd
order
Bandwidth Optimal
(IK)
Optimal
(CCT)
Party controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the district level. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Sample includes all races with any Muslim candidates. Optimal bandwidths are
determined by the algorithms suggested in Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012 (IK) and Calonico et al., 2014
(CCT). In each case, the first column in a pair indicates a stronger potential Muslim disadvantage. Muslim
population share and Hindu Muslim literacy differential data are from 2001 state level census for 16 major
states. Classification for population share is bottom eight states (low population share) versus top eight.
Classification for literacy differential is less than 1 percentage point (low differential) versus others.
23 Muslim candidates are significantly less likely to belong to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which often
espouses an explicit ideology of ‘Hindutva’, and they are significantly more likely to belong to the Indian
National Congress (INC) or the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).
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population (columns (5) and (6)), and where the literacy differential between Hindus
and Muslims is smaller (columns (7) and (8)).24 While the standard errors are too
large to conclude that these estimates are statistically different, it is clear that the
patterns are similar to the patterns observed for women’s political candidacy. In
particular, there is a statistically significant ‘discouragement’ of entry of new candidates
in states where the population share of Muslims is low (Table 8, panel (b), column
5).The fact that the pattern of results for religious minorities is similar to the pattern
we identified for women suggests that the results for women are unlikely to be
predominantly a reflection of gender-specific factors.25
6. Conclusions
Many reasons have been proposed for the gender gap in leadership positions. These
include ‘supply-side’ factors such as the lower ambition of women (Lawless and Fox,
2010), the lack of women role models (Beaman et al., 2012), women’s aversion to
competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Petrie and Segal, 2014), their fertility
and family commitments which conflict with intensive and inflexible work schedules
(Bertrand et al., 2010; Goldin, 2014) and ‘stereotype threat’. There can also be ‘demand-
side’ factors such as parties or voters having greater preferences for male candidates. It is
often argued that the scarcity of female role models reinforces these preferences and
prejudices, and that women winning in a competitive race against men can therefore
encourage the political participation of other women. Also, if women legislators play a
role in the selection of candidates for the next election and are not contesting
themselves, then they may directly encourage candidacy among other women.
We investigate the presence of such demonstration effects using quasi-experimental
constituency-level variation in women winning political office in India’s state elections.
We identify a large and significant increase in the subsequent share of women
candidates fielded by major parties in Indian state elections, driven entirely by a
greater propensity for incumbent women relative to incumbent men to run for re-
election. Given that a substantial fraction of incumbents in Indian state elections do
not re-run and female incumbents overall are less likely to re-run than male
incumbents, this is an important result.
We decisively reject that new women candidates are induced to enter politics, either
in their own constituency or in neighbouring constituencies. In fact, a woman winning
office appears to intensify barriers to the entry of new women in areas characterised by
relatively high levels of gender prejudice. We find similar results following a Muslim
winning against a non-Muslim candidate, which undermines the relevance of gender-
specific preferences or constraints.
24 Using a new dataset we created on incidents of religious violence from newspaper reports in the Times of
India (Kaysser et al., 2014; an updated version of Varshney and Wilkinson, 2006), we find that the candidacy
response is also larger in states that experienced fewer incidents of religious violence over the period 1980
2010 (results available upon request).
25 We attempted a similar analysis distinguishing high and low castes, but this was limited by sample size
because we are only able to identify caste for individual candidates in elections after 2003. Examining close
elections of SC/ST candidates against others in this limited sample, we find a similar absence of
‘demonstration effects’ on candidacy of scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST), who are the
historically disadvantaged caste groups. Results are available upon request.
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Ours is the first systematic analysis of political candidacy in competitive elections in India.
Our results suggest that furthereconomic, institutionalorpolicy incentivesmaybeneeded to
stimulate theentry ofnewwomen into thepolitical arena.Notonly aredemonstrationeffects
too weak to generate an endogenous increase in women’s candidacy, demonstrated success
results in persistence and possible intensification of barriers to political participation in
gender-biased areas. Initiatives that are likely to have greater success are those targeted
towards changing theattitudesof voters andparties ingender-biasedareas, or thoseenabling
women to overcome societal barriers to political participation.
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